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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
The appellants in this matter are Richard Ferguson, III, and Hollywood Body 
Salon, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability company, d/b/a Hollywood Body Laser Center. 
The Appellee is Dr. Rinda Ellis. 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of §78A-3-102 of Utah Code 
Annot. 1953 as amended. 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly find that a settlement between all parties to this 
Appeal and all issues had been reached. Standard of review should be 
abuse of discretion. 
2. Did the trial court properly and independently find that the actions of the 
Appellants, at the trial level, were dilatory and/or abusive to the judicial 
process, and, thereby, properly award attorney fees to plaintiff. Standard of 
review should be abuse of discretion. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY. AND RULE PROVISIONS 
None 
STATEMENT OF THE_CASE 
(Appellee's Supplementation) 
Appellee generally accepts the outline of facts and events in this proceeding as set-
out in the Brief of Appellant, except as specifically challenged or supplemented below: 
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1. The Court may find it significant that the required subsequent event for the 
Judgment to be final and enforceable has been met by the continuation of the Hollywood 
Body Laser Center remaining in business at the original physical location where it was 
located when the action was commenced and for the required period after the Judgment. 
See Affidavit of third party confirming operation of the business at the designated 
premises, Record on Appeal (ROA) pp. 206 to 217. A copy of this Affidavit confirming 
the required subsequent event, as filed with the trial court, is also included as part of 
Appellee's appendix items, Item 1. 
2. Appellant attempts to make some issue out of the initial email 
correspondence of plaintiff s counsel to defendants' counsel regarding the settlement as 
somehow fully determining or evidencing that the "settlement" was meant only to include 
the entity defendant and not the individual, Richard Ferguson, III. However, Appellee 
asserts that if the Court is going to employ a linguistic analysis to solve what that parties' 
subjective intent was, then the Court should review all correspondence between 
plaintiffs and defendants' attorney. As a result, all of the email or letter correspondence 
is included by the Appellee as part of its appendix and is further found as presented to the 
trial court as an exhibit to the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Settlement 
and the Entry of the Settlement Agreement. ROA pp. 119 to 129 and also attached 
hereto as part of Appellee's appendix, Item 2. Specific references to this part of the 
record will be cited as part of the Appellee's argument in opposition. 
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3. Counsel for plaintiff takes exception to the apparent characterization of 
plaintiffs Affidavit starting on page 3 and continuing on page 4 of the Appellant's Brief 
that he (plaintiffs counsel) believed a settlement had been reached only between Dr. 
Rinda Ellis and Hollywood Body Laser Center. In point of fact, the Affidavit of 
plaintiffs counsel (ROA pp. 139 to 148) clearly establishes that counsel for plaintiff (and 
by representation the plaintiff) believed that a full settlement, based upon the emails and 
telephone conversations, had been reached between all parties and all issues, including 
Mr. Richard Ferguson, III. A copy of plaintiff s Affidavit is also attached hereto as part 
of Appellee's appendix, Item 3. 
4. The early suggestion of counsel for plaintiff/appellee that as a possible 
addition to the settlement agreement some security be granted in defendant's equipment 
if the business did not continue was not pursued and was not a part of the final proposed 
and memorialized settlement agreement as interpreted by either plaintiff and defendants 
and should not be considered an issue with regard to this appeal. 
5. Defendants/appellants continuously stipulate in the argument portion of their 
Brief that some settlement was reached, and as a result appellants should, by such 
admission, be estopped from now arguing there was no meeting of the minds. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding from the totality of the 
evidence, including the correspondence before it, that a final settlement agreement had 
been reached between the parties involving all parties and all issues. 
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2. Settlement agreements are "favored in the law" and, as such, all reasonable 
inferences and common practices should be indulged to apply the settlement in the most 
comprehensive and liberal manner possible for public policy reasons. 
3. This Court should independently consider as an equitable bar against 
defendants '/appellants' arguments the fact that defendants had ample opportunity, if not 
duty, to timely object to the form of the proposed settlement based upon plaintiffs 
understanding that it involved all parties and all issues when first presented in formal 
terms to defendants, but waived a right of timely objection by knowingly reserving that 
objection until the matter was formally filed before the trial court for involuntary 
approval. Such a dilatory strategy should constitute an equitable estoppel to now 
challenging the trial court's findings on appeal. Further, the theory of settlement 
advanced by defendants/appellants is not equitable. 
4. Even if defendants' alternative theory of settlement was a possible 
alternative, this Court should not overturn the trial court's finding under the abuse of 
discretion standard. 
5. The findings of the Court awarding attorney fees is independent from the 
settlement issue and is adequately based upon a finding of dilatory and abusive practices 
before the trial court by defendants in all events. Further, this issue is apparently not 
raised by appellants. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
(Entry of Settlement Agreement!) 
Dr. Ellis, and her undersigned counsel, do not take exception to the general 
statement of law by the appellants that a settlement agreement is a form of contract and 
must meet the basic elements of contract formation to be binding upon the parties. 
Further, appellee agrees with appellants that settlement agreements are "favored in law" 
for various public policy reasons, and, therefore, form a special category of contracts. 
See Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 581 at 584 (Utah App. 
1993) incorporating this general standard. Perhaps the most extensive and emphatic 
statement of this principle was enunciated by this Court in the case of In. Re. Adoption of 
E.H., 103 P.3d 177 at 180-181 (Utah App. 2004): 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it is a basic rule that 
the law favors the settlement of disputes. Mascaro, 741 P.2d 
at 942. Such settlements are favored in the law, and should 
be encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not 
only to the parties, but also to the judicial system. Tracy-
Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 
(Utah 1979). 
The Court has also reaffirmed that the basic elements of contract must be found, 
such as meeting of the minds and consideration. 
While it is true, as appellants5 contend, that the Court cannot substitute a missing 
necessary contractual element to enforce a settlement agreement, it is equally true that the 
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expression that these types of contracts are "favored in law" must also have some 
application to the construction or interpretation of the issues at hand. Appellee contends 
that the "favored in law" mantra should, under the facts of this case, at least, weigh 
heavily in deciding the following elements in favor of a complete settlement as to ail 
parties. See Am. Jur. 2d., Contracts, §397: 
1. Appellants' conflicting and inconsistent position that there was a contract of 
settlement entered, but that there was not a "meeting of the minds/' must be disregarded 
and a determination made that a contract was entered upon admission. Reasonable 
assumptions, intent, course of dealing and practices should all be indulged to determine 
the contract terms if there is any ambiguity to a contract favored in law. 
2. Neither party is entitled to rely upon its own subjective state of mind to 
supply missing terms or to define ambiguous terms between the parties to the contract. 
3. Standard, reasonable and customary practices, usage, procedures, and 
inferences should be applied to find the fullest application of a contract favored in law. 
Linguistic Approach 
Appellee would first refer the Court to the complete series of written exchanges 
between counsel for appellee/plaintiff and counsel for appellants/defendants to assert that 
there are numerous provisions in those written exchanges which would raise a reasonable 
inference that the settlement was intended to include all parties, including Mr. Richard 
Ferguson, III. Specifically, the Court is respectfully referred to the following excerpts 
from those written exchanges as part of the ROA and appendix to this Brief: 
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1. In the initial response to a settlement offer from appellee dated Friday, 
October 26th, 2007 (ROA p. 129 and appellee's appendix), the use of "he" rather than "it" 
is clearly evidenced in the second paragraph, which usage appellee clearly asserts should 
indicate that the settlement proposal was to include an individual, Mr. Ferguson, and not 
just the entity, which would have been referred to as an "it". 
2. In the response of Mr. Black dated October 26tl\ 2007 (ROA p. 128 and 
appellee's appendix), Mr. Black responds that "his" client is out of town, indicating that 
the client being discussed is an individual, not an entity which could not physically be out 
of town. 
3. In the email from my office to Mr. Black dated December 11th, 2007 (ROA 
p. 125 and appellee's appendix), reference is made that the plaintiff would like to finish 
and finalize the resolution of the Ellis v. Ferguson matter prior to the end of the year, 
clearly indicating a focus upon Ferguson as being a named person or individual in the 
resolution of this case, as the case would otherwise continue as to Mr. Ferguson. 
4. In the email from my office to Mr. Black dated January 2nd, 2008 (ROA p. 
124 and appellee's appendix), reference is made to "finishing" the above litigation which 
would imply finishing as to all parties. With counsel for plaintiff stating that we would 
like this matter "concluded" within the next week to ten days, if it all possible, the clear 
implication is the case be concluded or resolved as to all parties and issues. 
5. In the email dated January 18th, 2008 from my office to Mr. Black (ROA p. 
123 and appellee's appendix), I referenced Mr. Black's client as "his," indicating clearly 
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my understanding and intent that the client responsible for the delay of the settlement was 
Mr. Ferguson. 
6. In the letter of January 28th, 2008 from my office to Mr. Black (ROA p. 122 
and appellee's appendix), I indicated to him my frustration over his client's failure to 
complete the settlement of this case, clearly implying that the failure of the compromise 
was Mr. Ferguson, not other parties. This correspondence is also significant in that, at 
this time, an actual copy of the proposed Motion and settlement Order was forwarded to 
Mr. Black, clearly indicating that our intent and understanding was a settlement as to all 
parties and issues. 
7. In the final letter of March 3rd, 2008 to Mr. Black (ROA p. 120 to 121 and 
appellee's appendix), I referenced the mutual settlement and release agreement proposals 
being between "our clients" indicating an intent to include all clients on both sides in 
using a plural. There is also a further reference in the second to last line of that paragraph 
referencing "his" and "your default" which we believe is a clear reference to Mr. 
Ferguson individually, and Mr. Black, as his counsel. 
Taken in their totality, it is believed that the foregoing clearly constitutes a 
reasonable basis for this Court to determine and rule that the intended settlement was 
between all parties as to all issues and was meant to conclude the litigation. Certainly, 
after January of 2008, Mr. Black was formally on notice of this position by the 
forwarding of an intended Motion to Compel Settlement as to all parties and issues. 
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Standard Practice Approach 
Even if the Court does not find, from a totality of the foregoing communications, 
that there is a sufficient basis under the abuse of discretion standard to find that all parties 
were intended to be included within the settlement, then this Court should look next to 
applying a reasonable and customary practice standard to find that a release generally 
means and includes all parties and issues unless specifically reserved otherwise. 
While there is not extensive case authority in Utah on this course of dealing and 
customary meaning argument, appellee would respectfully refer to the finding of this 
Court in Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 180 P.3d 765 at 770-771 (Utah App. 2008), 
in which this Court considered an assertion by one of the parties on appeal requesting this 
Court to adopt the general rule of law favored in most jurisdictions that parties to a 
settlement agreement waive any claims or omission not expressly reserved from or in the 
settlement agreement, citing Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.3d 133 at 144 
(2d Cir. 2000), and other cases. It appears that this Court adopted the general rule of law 
in the Coet v. Labrum case from Krumme that a broad application should be given to 
settlement agreements as a favored type of contract to include all issues, and by 
reasonable extension, all "parties" unless specifically reserved from the agreement. If a 
general release of all parties was not intended by this Court's decision in Coet v. Labrum, 
we would respectfully ask the Court's reasonable extension of this doctrine to include not 
only all issues, but all parties unless specifically reserved from a general settlement 
agreement. 
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Standard of Review Approach 
A third approach, as it relates to the reasonable interpretation and application of 
settlement agreement standards, would begin with the premise that appellants have 
stipulated and agreed that some form of settlement agreement was reached. The debate 
then focuses only on what is the reasonable interpretation and application of that 
settlement agreement. The standard to be applied towards the trial judge's interpretation 
and application is clearly the "abuse of discretion" standard. Even if one concedes that 
appellants can advance a reasonable argument for their interpretation of the settlement 
terms (though disputed by appellee), the appellants' position still would fail to require this 
Court to adopt that interpretation under an application of the abuse of discretion standard, 
since clearly the trial judge could have reasonably also reached the alternative decision 
which he entered. This Court should not reverse or second guess a determination and 
decision of the trial court, even though an alternative explanation is possible, unless there 
is a clear showing of "abuse of discretion." 
Equitable Considerations 
In addition to the direct analyses of the trial court's ruling setout above by appellee, 
Dr. Ellis also believes that the Court should consider and apply, if necessary, certain 
equitable standards in considering the issue as to whether the trial judge properly found a 
settlement agreement as to all parties and issues. 
The first argument in equity should be a consideration of the basic inequality of 
the decision which the appellants are urging upon this Court by their interpretation of the 
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facts. In substance, what the appellants are arguing is that an agreement was reached for 
settlement, and somehow, based upon their subjective linguistic analysis, the trial court 
ought to find that the agreement was for the release only of the business entity. In short, 
what the appellants argue is that plaintiff should have been happy to release both the 
business entity and Mr. Ferguson, but, at the same time, insulate Mr. Ferguson from any 
obligation to pay any portion of the settlement consideration. Clearly, the Court must see 
that this is not a neutral construction of the facts, but is a construction highly favorable to 
appellants; that is, that they get the release of all parties on their side of the ledger by a 
commitment to pay the consideration only by the dubious and potentially insolvent entity 
defendant. Under no rational construction would one believe that this is an agreement into 
which plaintiff would have entered. In point of fact, the plaintiff would probably have 
been willing to enter into an agreement to release only the entity defendant for the 
$15,000 and preserve and pursue their claims against the individual defendant, Mr. 
Ferguson. This would be a logical and consistent alternative construction of the contract, 
but is not one presently advanced before this Court by either party. 
The alternative construction advanced by the present defendants is not only unfair 
and unreasonable, but would not have made any economic sense to the plaintiff and there 
is not a scintilla of evidence which would support this construction from any reading of 
the documents. A short hand statement rejecting this principle might be: absent a clear 
and unmistakable agreement to the contrary, it should not be assumed that Mr. Ferguson 
was to be released without any obligation to participate in the settlement agreement. A 
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neutral subjective construction, i.e. Mr. Ferguson was not to pay or be released, would not 
satisfy the public policy criteria that settlements are generally to be final and 
comprehensive. 
A final equitable argument arises out of the fact that Mr. Black's clients avoided 
and deferred raising any objection to the settlement until after defendants were put upon 
actual notice by a formal copy of the proposed settlement terms through the Motion 
attached to the letter to Mr. Black in January, 2008 (ROA p. 122 and appellee's appendix). 
Rather than acting in a timely and reasonable manner at that juncture to inform plaintiffs 
counsel that the settlement terms were not acceptable or as agreed, the defendants and 
their counsel deferred, without any reasonable explanation, until approximately March 
2008 when the formal application for entry of the comprehensive settlement was formally 
filed with the Court which then forced defendants to first reveal their "theory" of 
settlement terms. Clearly, the appellee feels that an estoppel should be applied by this 
Court (if it does not otherwise decide the foregoing issues in favor of appellee) that the 
defendants waived their objections by unreasonably deferring any objection and causing 
substantial additional time and effort to both counsel for the plaintiff and the trial court in 
ultimately resolving this issue. 
POINT II. 
(ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES) 
Appellee believes it should be clear from a reading of Judge Faust's written 
opinion in this matter (ROA pp. 178 to 181 and appellants' appendix) that Judge Faust 
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clearly bifurcated and made a separate and distinct ruling concerning the award of 
attorney fees to plaintiff in this matter due to the dilatory and evasive manner in which 
defendants avoided and unnecessarily protracted the resolution of what would have been 
an easily resolved issue early in the proceeding. As a result, the trial court allowed 
attorney fees arising out of additional or extra costs incurred by plaintiff beginning with 
defendants' unfulfilled promise to draft the mutual settlement and ending in compelling 
the entry of the settlement agreement after extensive requests and pleadings to the 
defendants to complete the process. 
As a threshold argument, appellee asserts that the defendants and their counsel, 
despite ample opportunity, did not raise at the trial level any objection or argument either 
as to the appropriateness of awarding attorney fees or the amount of such attorney fees. 
As a result, appellee believes that this matter cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 
or addressed on appeal. See Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National American, Jus. 
Co., 749 P.2d 651, at 654 (Utah 1988); Shine Development v. Frontier Investments, 779 
P.2d 221 at 224 (Utah App. 1990). 
Even further, it does not appear that the appellants have attempted to raise or argue 
this issue separately as part of their brief on appeal. As a result, appellee believes that this 
is not a matter before the Court, and regardless of the decision of this Court as to the 
primary issue of the enforcement of the Settlement, the issues of attorney fees should be 
allowed to stand as a separate and distinct part of the Judgment based upon the trial 
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court's independent consideration and ruling and the lack of any timely objection to the 
award of such fees. 
However, if this Court determines the trial court's award of attorney fees is 
properly before them, then appellee/plaintiff would argue that the trial court had broad 
discretion to award attorney fees for what it deemed to be dilatory and delaying actions by 
these defendants. With regard to this issue, the appellee would respectfully refer the 
Court to the case of R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068 at 
1080-1081 (Utah 1997), where, in a rule 11 application, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
We agree with the court of appeals that rule 11 gives trial 
courts great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit the 
requirements of the particular case and that we will affirm the 
particular sanction imposed by the trial court absent an abuse 
of discretion (citation omitted). Here the trial court based its 
ruling on Malouf s dilatory tactics and filing pleadings that 
were not relevant or productive in the prosecution of this 
case... In light of his improper and oppressive conduct, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that he 
personally pay a portion of MEFs attorney fees. 
Further, in the case of Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 60 P.3d 1176 at 
1179 (Ct. App. 2002), this Court said: 
There are numerous exceptions to the general attorney fees 
rule because a court has inherent equitable power to award 
reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the 
interest of justice and equity (citations omitted). Exceptions 
include: when a party acts in bad faith, veraciously, wantonly, 
or for oppressive reasons. 
It is also clear from both the R & R Energies case and Macris & Associates cases 
cited above, as well as Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 855 P.2d 759 at 782 
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(Utah 1994), that the decision of the trial judge to award attorney fees to prevent abusive 
practices arises from a broad equitable power. It also is true that the review of the 
exercise of that equitable power, both in the allowance and the amount awarded, is 
controlled by the "abuse of discretion'' standard. See Hughes v. Cafferty, 89 P.3d 148 at 
152, H.N. 4 (Utah 2004). 
CONCLUSION 
Under any reasonable application of the facts before it, the trial court properly 
determined that a settlement agreement had been reached between all parties, and this 
decision should not be reversed by this Court absent a clear showing of abuse of 
discretion, which has not been established. 
Secondly, the trial court also reasonably determined and awarded a modest amount 
of attorney fees for the extra time and procedures caused by the defendants' omissions 
and dilatory actions for which appellee does not believe an issue is properly raised before 
this Court; but, even if considered by the Court, should be sustained in favor of the 
appellee, again based upon the abuse of discretion standard. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2008. 
JuljumD. Jensen / 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,nd I hereby certify that on the 22 day of September, 2008,1 delivered the required 
number of the foregoing Brief of the Appellee to the Appellants' counsel by placing the 
same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
David O. Black 
5806 S. 900 E. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 -1644 
/gM^ /)- (/£ TAS~4L£^-*~-
JuLten D. Jensen 
torney for Appellee 
APPENDIX 
Item 1 - Third Party Affidavit 
Item 2 - Email Correspondences Regarding Settlement 
Item 3 - Affidavit of Plaintiff s Counsel 
ITEM1 
JULIAN D. JENSEN (Bar #1679) 
JENSEN. DUFFIN & DIBB, LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Dr. Rinda Ellis, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richard Ferguson, III., Cord Beatty, 
Hollywood Body Salon, LLC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, d/b/a 
Hollywood Body Laser Center, and any 
other successor entity or d/b/a as subsequent 
John Doe Entities 1 -X, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF HYE LEE, AN 
INDEPENDENT PERSON, IN 
SUPPORT OF THE ATTACHED 
AND INCORPORATED 
CERTIFICATION OF 
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT TO 
JUDGMENT 
CNil No.: 070903441 CN 
Judge: Robert Faust 
State of Utah 
County of Utah 
:ss 
) 
COMES NOW the undersigned Hye Lee, who being first duly sworn and upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows 
1. Affiant is an adult person over the age of 21 years and is of sound and disposing 
mmd 
2. Affiant is the legal assistant to the counsel for the plaintiff in the above captioned 
matter, but is not otherwise an interested person or party to the action. 
3. Affiant was asked to make and enter this Affidavit in support of the Certification 
of the Event Subsequent and has done so and reports the same in this Affidavit of her own 
observation and determination. 
4. Affiant would testify in the same manner set-out in this Affidavit if called as a 
witness in this proceeding and is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. Affiant represents that on May 31sl she, at the request of counsel for the plaintiff, 
physically visited the business premises of the business entity doing business as Hollywood 
Body Laser Center, located at 7430 Creek Rd., Suite 101, Sandy, Utah. 
6. Affiant represents that she visited such business premises at approximately the 
hour of 4:40P.M. to 5:15P.M. on such date and observed what appeared to be normal business 
activity at such Hollywood Body Laser Center. In particular, she noticed advertising and signage 
on the business operation premises indicating the name as set-out above for the business, and an 
open sign near or upon the door. The premises appeared to be open and was lighted. 
7. Affiant further, in substantiation of her foregoing testimony, has attached as 
Exhibit "A" to this Affidavit a picture of the business premises at the time observed on May 31sl 
and to create a photographic record of the events described by this Affiant. 
8. Affiant further telephone the business premises on June 2nd, 2008 and determined 
the business was operating under the above name and making appointments for treatment. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT AT THIS TIME. 
live Lee 
State of Utah ) 
:ss. 
County of Utah ) 
On t h e ^ clay of June 2008, Hye Lee personally appeared before me, a Notary Public, 
and swore to and signed the foregoing Affidavit in my presence. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires! Residing at: 
Notary Public 
£& MARJORIEE.TURNEY 
1655 East 2100 South 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84105 
My Commission Expires 
October 3,2010 
State of Utah 

" ~*tyv*+i 
.&?,rr"** 
ITEM 2 
LAW OFFICES 
JENSEN, DUFFIN & DIBB, LLP 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 380 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
JULIAN D JENSEN, P.C TELEPHONE 
DANIEL 0 DUFFIN, P.C (801) 531-6600 
BRUCE L DIBB, P.C TELECOPIER 
(801) 521-3731 
E-Muii jdcdj@aros.net 
March 3, 2008 
Mr. David 0. Black, Esq. 
5806 S. 900 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Re: Settlement Ellis v. Ferguson 
Dear David: 
A couple of weeks ago we had a telephone conversation in which you assured me 
that you would prepare the Mutual Release and Settlement which we had earlier 
discussed and agreed upon between our clients in the above case. Since I have never 
received any such proposal, I have gone ahead and drafted a Mutual Release which what 
I believe incorporates our prior understanding and agreement from my notes with regard 
to this settlement. Since your client proffered to pay the amount within six months, if the 
establishment was still operating, I have used my record date for when I receive back that 
communication in November to complete the six month period as being April. l s\ 2008 
and incorporated that date into the draft. I am anticipating some objection from you 
concerning this date, but I want you to realize it is totally unfair and unreasonable for 
your client to engage in delaying and dilatory tactics after making a proposal to pay 
within a six month period; and then, say because we did not draft the Agreement through 
his and your default and negligence that you may be entitled to the six months from the 
date of the actual Agreement. 1 find this unethical and unacceptable. 
Qui office would be wiling to accept an) reasonable changes m modification." lo 
the Agreement, but believe that the essential terms must remain as earlier agreed. 
finally, if] do not receive a response back from you to this Settlement Agreement 
within the next ten (10) days. 1 will then file the earlier Motion 1 prepared to compel 
enforcement of settlement m this case: or. alternatively, set a Scheduling Order. 1 believe 
from the history of our exchanges and my file notes that you will not be in a position to 
denv that we reached an agreement in principle to settle this case. 
Mr. David O. Black. Esq. 
March 3. 2008 
lJtme 2 
.ID J/hi 
Cc: Dr. Rinda Ellis 
Sincerely. 
4A^ jQ ' 
j&n D. Jensen. 
Attorney at Law 
.'\.<0^— 
Encl. 
LAW OFFICES 
JENSEN, DUFFIN & DIBB, LLP 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 380 
SALT LAKE CITY, U'lAH 84111 
JULIAN D JENSEN, PC 
DANIEL O DUFFIN, PC 
BRUCE L DIBB, PC 
January 28, 2008 
Mi. David 0 Black, Esq. 
5806S .%0E 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Re. Ellis v. Ferguson 
Dear David: 
I have to confess that I have really never had the experience of 'working with 
another attorney who I could not communicate with either by telephone, email, or regular 
mail. I simply do not know what has happened to your client's prior commitment to settle 
this case as outlined between our offices? At any rate, I am prepared to file the enclosed 
Motion to confirm the settlement; or, alternatively, request a Scheduling Conference in 
this case. I would hope and trust this would not be necessary, but I am going to file this 
Motion at the end of seven days from this letter if I have not heard back from you 
concerning this matter. 
Thank you for you attention to these issues. 
Sincerely, 
JuMnD Jcnseja 
Attorney at Law 
TELEPHONE 
(801) 531-6600 
TELECOPIER 
(801) 521 3731 
E-Mail )dcdj<§uros net 
JDJ/hl 
End 
Julian Jensen 
From: "Julian Jensen" <jjensen@jdcdj.com> 
To: "David O Black" <doblaw@comcast.net> 
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2008 10:18 AM 
Subject: Ellis v. Ferguson 
Dear David: 
Since you obviously do not like to return calls or emails, I am going to send you a physical copy of this email 
that you may perhaps read. Despite my repeated requests to your office to prepare a form of settlement, as 
earlier agreed upon, I can only assume that your client has-in his typical form- decided to renege on or otherwise 
avoid his prior settlement agreement with my client. As a result, I am planning on scheduling the court mandated 
planning conference between our offices for next Wednesday, January 23rd at 10:00A.M. by telephone. I am 
sure if this is not convenient for you, you will get back to me and we can arrange another time for the attorney 
scheduling conference which is long overdue in this case. If I do not hear back from you in any fashion, I will 
simply ask the court to set a planning/scheduling conference for us by a written petition and recite the reasons 
from my perspective that we have not voluntarily accomplished this task between our offices. 
Thank you for your attention to these matters. 
Sincerely, 
Julian D. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
cc: Via Regular Mail 
l/!8/20( 
Julian Jensen 
From: "Julian Jensen" <jjensen@jdcdj.com> 
To: "David 0 Black" <doblaw@comcast.net> 
Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2008 10:11 AM 
Subject: Ellis v. Ferguson 
Dear Dave: 
Now that the Holidays are over, I would like to wind up and finish the above litigation as we had earlier agreed 
in principle a few weeks ago. Could you please get back to me with a draft of your proposed Stipulation for 
Mutual Release or request my office to prepare the draft for your review and approval. Also, would you like our 
office to prepare the concurrent Rule 41 Stipulation and Order of Dismissal or will you also prepare that 
document? Please advise me on this at your earliest convenience. I would like to have this matter concluded 
within the next week to ten days, if it all possible. 
Sincerely, 
Julian D. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
1/2/2008 
Julian Jensen 
From: "Julian Jensen" <jjensen@jdcdj.com> 
To: "David O Black" <doblaw@comcast.net> 
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2007 11:44 AM 
Subject: Ellis v. Ferguson 
Dear Dave: 
Not to unduly burden you in any manner, but I am sure that both of us would like to finish up and finalize the 
resolution of the Ellis v. Ferguson matter prior to the end of the year. If there is anything that I can do to help you 
move this along, including doing what I would hope to be a neutral and fair draft of our outline settlement 
agreement, I would happy to do an initial draft on that matter. In any event, please get back to me at your earliest 
convenience. 
Sincerely, 
Julian D. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
12/11/20C 
Julian Jensen 
From: "Julian Jensen" <jjensen@jdcdj.com> 
To: "David 0 Black" <doblaw@comcast.net> 
Cc: "Rinda Ellis" <drrinda.ellis@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Friday, November 30, 2007 9:34 AM 
Subject: Ellis v. Ferguson Litigation 
Dear David: 
Just a follow-up note from our telephone conversation the other day, it was my understanding that your client 
had agreed to accept the settlement offer of my client for $15,000 conditional upon the existing laser salon 
operations still being in operation at the end of six month from the date of settlement. I indicated to you that I 
would be willing to draft up the stipulation if you are presently overwhelmed with other matters At any rate I 
appreciate you getting some form of stipulation of dismissal to me as soon as possible so that we can inform the 
court of the status of this matter. One other issue that was raised by my client, that seems fair and would not 
constitute any adverse burden as I see it is to request your client to grant to my client a security interest in assets 
of the business equal to her $15,000 claim in the event that it is liquidated. Do you mind discussing this with your 
client. 
Sincerely, 
Julian D. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
11/30/7007 
Julian Jensen 
From: "Julian Jensen" <jjensen@jdcdj.com> 
To: "David O Black" <doblaw@comcast.net> 
Cc: "Rinda Ellis" <rinda.ellis@intermountainmail.org>; "Rinda Ellis" <drrinda.ellis@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2007 12:05 PM 
Subject: Ellis v. Ferguson Settlement Efforts and Scheduling 
Dear Dave: 
It appears that your client is not yet ready to respond to our settlement offer. Since it is my responsibility as 
plaintiff to move this case forward, I am requesting by this email a telephone conference with you this week, if 
possible, or at your earliest convenience next week to completed the Rule 26 attorney planning conferenceand to 
schedule various cut-off dates in the above proceeding. I think during that conference, we should also agree on a 
date to exchange the Rule 26 documents and witness disclosure items. In our conference, we should also 
discuss the bifurcation of this case and how we will go forward with the arbitration portion as mandated by the 
court. I have in mind designating former Justice Michael Zimmerman as our arbitration person. 
Thank you for your attention to these matters. 
Sincerely, 
Julian D. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
11/14/200 
Julian Jensen 
From: <doblaw@comcast net> 
To: "Julian Jensen" <jjensen@jdcdj.com> 
Sent: Friday, October 26, 2007 10.54 AM 
Attach: Settlement of Dr Ellis v Ferguson and Related Entities eml 
Subject: Re Settlement of Dr Ellis v Ferguson and Related Entities 
Julian; Thank you for your prompt response. My client is out of town until the middle of next week and 
I am gone the latter part of the week. I will forward your proposal but will not be able to talk until the 
next week If that time frame doesn't work for you, please let me know. DOB 
Original message 
From: "Julian Jensen" <jjenseniSjjdc.dj_.cpni> 
> Dear David: 
> 
> Thank you for your telephone call and settlement offer of your client 
> yesterday concerning the above case. I have discussed this matter thoroughly 
> with my client and believe that we are very close to a resolution. Without 
> getting into specifics of our position on various issues which we discussed, my 
> client has authorized me to counter your client's proposal of $10,000, by 
> offering to settle for $15,000 which she understand would be paid, 
> conditionally, only if the current Hollywood Body Laser Center, located at 7430 
> Creek Rd., Suite 101, Sandy, Utah (or clearly defined successor entity) remained 
> in operation for a period in excess of 6 months from the date of settlement. 
> 
> Since no mention was made in our telephone conversation of how your client 
> proposed to pay the settlement amount, I presumed that he intended to pay in a 
> lump sum if the foregoing condition was met. We need clarification on this 
> issue so please get back to me. The other issue that my client has is that if 
> for some reason the business was ongoing but our client did not pay the 
> settlement amount, she should be treated in the manner of a secured note holder, 
> such that she would have the recourse to the assets of the existing salon for 
> failure to pay, plus interest and attorney fees and costs. 
> 
> Should we be able to reach an agreement as outlined above, our office would 
> be happy to prepare a standard Rule 41 Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with 
> Prejudice and a proposed draft of the Mutual Settlement Agreement, subject to 
> your offices' review and approval, 
> Thank you for your prompt attention to this counter and I hope we can move 
> promptly to resolve this matter between our clients and not waste further 
> attorney or court time on this case 
> Sincerely, 
> 
> Julian D Jensen 
> Attorney at Law 
10/9 
Julian J e n s e n 
From: "Julian Jensen" <jjensen@jdcdj.com> 
To: "David O Black" <doblaw@comcast.net> 
Cc: "Rinda Ellis" <rinda.ellis@intermountainmail.org>; "Rinda Ellis" <drrinda.ellis@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Friday, October 26, 2007 10:16 AM 
Subject: Settlement of Dr. Ellis v. Ferguson and Related Entities 
Dear David: 
Thank you for your telephone call and settlement offer of your client yesterday concerning the above case. I 
have discussed this matter thoroughly with my client and believe that we are very close to a resolution. Without 
getting into specifics of our position on various issues which we discussed, my client has authorized me to 
counter your client's proposal of $10,000, by offering to settle for $15,000 which she understand would be paid, 
conditionally, only if the current Hollywood Body Laser Center, located at 7430 Creek Rd., Suite 101, Sandy, Utah 
(or clearly defined successor entity) remained in operation for a period in excess of 6 months from the date of 
settlement. 
Since no mention was made in our telephone conversation of how your client proposed to pay the settlement 
amount, I presumed that he intended to pay in a lump sum if the foregoing condition was met. We need 
clarification on this issue so please get back to me. The other issue that my client has is that if for some reason 
the business was ongoing but our client did not pay the settlement amount, she should be treated in the manner 
of a secured note holder, such that she would have the recourse to the assets of the existing salon for failure to 
pay, plus interest and attorney fees and costs. 
Should we be able to reach an agreement as outlined above, our office would be happy to prepare a standard 
Rule 41 Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and a proposed draft of the Mutual Settlement 
Agreement, subject to your offices' review and approval. 
Thank you for your prompt attention to this counter and I hope we can move promptly to resolve this matter 
between our clients and not waste further attorney or court time on this case. 
Sincerely, 
Julian D. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
10/26/200 
ITEM 3 
JULIAN D. JENSEN (Bar #1679) 
JENSEN, DUFFIN & DIBB, LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City/Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Dr. Rinda Ellis, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richard Ferguson, III., Cord Beatty, 
Hollywood Body Salon, LLC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, d/b/a 
Hollywood Body Laser Center, and any 
other successor entity or d/b/a as subsequent 
John Doe Entities 1-X, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO COMPEL MUTUAL 
SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE 
AGREEMENT 
Civil No.: 070903441 CN 
Judge: Robert Faust 
State of Utah 
County of Utah 
:ss. 
COMBS "NOW the undersigned Julian D. Jensen who presents upon oath to the court as 
follows: 
1. Affiant is counsel of record for the named plaintiff in this proceeding and has 
been such at all times material to this cause of action. 
2. Affiant represents that the factual statements set-out in the concurrently filed 
Memorandum of Point and Authorities are personally laiown to this Affiant, as counsel for the 
plaintiff, and are true and accurately stated and that all referenced correspondence between 
counsel for plaintiff and counsel for defendant, Mr. David Black, were actually sent and received 
between such offices as stated in the recital of facts so far as known to counsel for plaintiff 
3. Affiant knows of no factual reason or basis in law why the petition for entry of the 
Mutual Settlement Agreement should not be ordered by this couil and asserts that the statement 
of facts in plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of entry of Settlement and Release fully and 
completely sets out all material factual events related to this Motion. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT AT THIS TIME, 
Julian D. Jensen •/ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
State of Utah ) 
:ss. 
County of Utah ) 
On the 14lh day of March 2008, Julian D. Jensen personally appeared before me, a Notary 
Public, and swore to and signed the foregoing Affidavit in my presence. 
N , , * •«. /
 f f 
Notary Public /• ' 
My Commission Expires: Residing jal: 
